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As Europe’s financial market contagion spreads to systemi-
cally  important  eurozone  members,  the  region  is  echoing 
with “end-game scenarios” (Johnson and Boone 2010) and 
demands  for  major  new  steps  by  European  policymakers 
(Financial Times 2010). Among these would be a European 
“fiscal transfer union,” a new common eurozone bond, action 
by the European Central Bank (ECB) to monetize sovereign 
debts, and finally a eurozone breakup itself.
No doubt the status quo cannot go on forever, but it 
would be a mistake to think that European policymakers are 
free to bring about clean, expeditious, and decisive reforms. 
The European Union is a complex hybrid entity, neither sover-
eign state nor international organization. Analogies with expe-
riences of continental-sized sovereign states like the United 
States or to the record of past interstate agreements do not 
provide a road map for solving Europe’s problems. Too many 
powerful political constraints to make any of these scenarios 
possible prevent easy answers.
I believe, on the other hand, that the European Union 
will do “whatever it takes” to save the euro and the eurozone. 
This could mean steps toward these solutions, but by other 
means  that  would  be  politically  messy  and  certainly  inel-
egant—though potentially effective.
Why are any of the above-mentioned scenarios unlikely? 
A European fiscal union with regular, institutionalized and 
large  transfers  between  eurozone  members  (analogous  to  a 
federal European budget) is not politically feasible in Europe. 
It wasn’t possible in the 1990s when Chancellor Helmut Kohl 
of  Germany  and  President  Francois  Mitterrand  of  France 
wisely resisted the idea, and it won’t be possible until a genuine 
pan-European identity emerges, which may never happen.
A “common eurozone bond,” to replace much or all of the 
existing sovereign member state debt, will always be vetoed by 
Germany—long concerned about granting direct and uncon-
ditional transfers to “undeserving peripheral countries” and 
incurring higher German borrowing costs.1 With the prin-
cipal taxation capacity in Europe residing with the individual 
member  state  governments,  a  common  “Eurobond”  would 
ultimately lack the democratic legitimacy to be feasible.
Monetizing  sovereign  debts  by  having  the  ECB  print 
money and buying up large amounts of peripheral debt would 
be theoretically feasible in the short term, but it would also 
run counter to both EU and German law and be vetoed by 
both the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the German 
Constitutional Court.
An exit from the eurozone, as I have said in other essays, 
would  bring  catastrophic  costs  for  anyone  who  tried  it—
including  Germany  (Kirkegaard  2010a).  Deceptively  easy 
recommendations to quit just because the going inside the 
1. Note that financial markets in essence granted the eurozone the functional 
equivalent of a “common eurozone bond” from the beginning of the euro 
until 2008, when they lent freely to all member states at German levels. This 
“freebie” to the periphery, however, would not be repeated in an actual com-
mon eurozone bond as lower borrowing costs for the periphery would come at 
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euro has now gotten tougher ignore the simple fact that life 
on the outside will still be significantly worse. No democratic 
government inside the eurozone will likely go there.
The reason for believing that EU leaders will “do whatever 
it takes” to save the euro lies in the historical reality of the 
European Union as a “permanent crisis response mechanism,” 
conceived after World War II to knit the region together and 
produce  economies  of  scale  in  the  global  market,  stabilize 
exchange rate volatility with a common currency, and cope 
with new problems that now include climate change. Despite 
its  difficulties,  the  European  Union  remains  a  frustrating, 
though innovative, “work in progress.”
Three constraints limit EU leaders in dealing with the 
current crisis.
First, eurozone members operate under limited national 
sovereignty  and  cannot  unilaterally  default  on  parts  of 
their debts as Russia did in 1998 or Argentina did in 2001. 
Membership of the European Union politically and practically 
requires that any reductions in the sovereign or sovereign-
guaranteed senior bank debt be done in collaboration with a 
country’s European partners and the ECB. It will never be in 
the national interest of a eurozone and/or EU member to turn 
its back on the rest of the club.
Second, a new round of referenda on EU treaty changes 
is out of the question. Germany’s desire for an amendment 
to the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, requiring that future creditors be 
forced to take haircuts in the event of another financial crisis, 
has set up a new internal tension within the European Union. 
Germany wants such a revision to take place without a refer-
endum (allowed under article 48 for simplified revisions). But 
debtor countries like Ireland are likely to insist on a referendum 
unless they win concessions from Germany and other creditor 
countries that would make it easier to pay off their obligations.
Third,  EU  leaders  cannot  permit  solutions  that  pose 
undue risks of a systemic bank run inside the eurozone like 
the run that followed the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy two 
years ago. Bank vulnerability to such risks is clear because of 
the importance of banks (as opposed to bond markets) in the 
EU financial system. That vulnerability is also the result of 
weak capitalization levels in the eurozone banking sector, the 
region’s anemic growth rate, the poor health of banks’ loan 
books, and the fiscal deficits of EU sovereigns standing behind 
the banks. (As Simon Johnson (2010) has repeatedly pointed 
out, the danger is heightened by the huge size of the banks 
relative to country GDP).
As a result of these factors, the talk of imposing haircuts 
on senior bank debt holders has been unacceptable so far, even 
to the point of Irish pensioners being forced to take the hit first 
in the bailout of their financial system (Kirkegaard 2010a).
Despite these problems, it is not clear that this dire situ-
ation will persist forever. By playing for time and offering 
liquidity support for troubled countries now, Europeans are 
counting on a return of growth leading to higher general bank 
capital levels, improved government fiscal positions and less 
need of such haircuts. Even more to the point, a rejection of 
restructuring of senior bank debt or even sovereign debt right 
now does not rule out such a step in the future.
Clues about the likely direction of future EU crisis response 
compromises can be seen in the decisions so far—the bailouts 
for Greece on May 9–10 and Ireland on November 28.
First, the Greek package: In the two-stage “grand bargain” 
(Kirkegaard 2010b) in May, the ECB extended its balance 
sheet by first accepting “junk collateral” and then purchasing 
“junk” directly through its Securities Market Program (SMP).2 
The SMP is a flexible crisis-management tool reflecting the 
unusual legal independence of the ECB.3 Purchases through 
it are at the discretion of the ECB Governing Council, where 
decisions may be taken by simple majority vote, in which each 
of the 22 members have just one vote.4 It would thus be a 
mistake to underestimate the willingness of the council to use 
it if the survival of the euro is at risk.
For now it makes no sense for the ECB to tell the world 
just  how  big  its  SMP  “bazooka”  is.  If  the  bank  were  to 
announce a large SMP target,5 it would lose the value of ambi-
guity. In reality, markets are better reassured by an implied 
willingness from the bank to do whatever it takes. And if there 
2. As of November 26, the ECB (2010b) had purchased €67.2 billion of assets 
through the SMP.
3. With its treaty-defined independence, the ECB is immune to the kinds 
of “threats” from members of Congress to reform the Federal Reserve’s “dual 
mandate” following its decision to launch quantitative easing II (Harding 
2010). The ECB answers to no individual government or parliament.
4. The ECB Governing Council consists of the six members of the ECB 
Executive Board, plus the 16 heads of the national banks of the eurozone 
member states. On January 1, 2011, the Estonian central bank governor will 
become the 23rd member of the ECB Governing Council.
5. Note that the ECB Governing Council could in theory, if it so desired, also 
stop sterilizing SMP purchases, turning SMP interventions into activities more 
akin to quantitative easing.
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is a fixed ceiling on what the central bank is willing to do, 
traders in private sector banks might try to profit from specu-
lating against it.
Separately, to deal with the crisis, EU and/or eurozone 
member  states  have  offered  an  assistance  package  focused 
initially on countries in the periphery, which imposes austerity 
in  the  form  of  structural  reforms  to  achieve  growth.  This 
package is accompanied by “bailout money” from the IMF 
to provide liquidity support for first Greece (€110 billion, 
of which €30 billion comes in the form of an IMF standby 
arrangement (IMF 2010) and the remaining €80 billion from 
the eurozone countries, excluding Slovakia). In addition, the 
broader  eurozone  has  established  the  European  Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF) with €440 billion ready to be used 
and the European Financial Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM) 
with €60 billion.
These instruments vary in how they work. The EFSF is a 
eurozone-only facility, designed to issue bonds or other debt 
instruments to raise the funds for loans to troubled eurozone 
countries. Its bond issues would be backed by guarantees from 
euro area member states of up to €440 billion in accordance 
with their share in the paid-up capital (EFSF 2010) of the 
ECB. In effect, the EFSF and SMP are backed in the same 
way by the same eurozone governments.6 The EFSM, however, 
is backed by all the EU-27 members through their respective 
share of the European Commission [EC] budget.7 
In short, the EU policy response can be separated into 
two  categories:  real  economy  measures,  i.e.,  austerity  and 
structural reforms; and liquidity facilities, i.e., all the facilities 
(SMP, EFSF, EFSM, and Greece’s special package) for finan-
cially troubled member states. While it is true that the ECB’s 
SMP is technically not a “lending facility,” but a “systemic 
stability-enhancing  facility,”  aimed  at  ensuring  depth  and 
liquidity  in  dysfunctional  financial  markets  (ECB  2010a), 
the ultimate outcome is similar in the form of lowering the 
borrowing costs for crisis-stricken members.
The European Union’s real economy measures are aimed 
at lowering deficits (austerity) and raising longer-term growth 
potential (implicitly trying to deal with solvency). But the 
concept  of  expanding  growth  in  the  short  term  through 
consolidation is largely a myth. That is true at least in fixed 
exchange rate regimes in periods of depressed regional growth, 
though  political  leaders  sometimes  try  to  solicit  political 
6. The EFSF has provisions built in that, in order to secure its AAA rating, 
requires each participating government to guarantee (EFSF 2010) up to 120 
percent of its share. The ECB paid-up capital structure has no such provisions.
7. The European Commission (2010) budget consists of both “own resources” 
(mostly customs duties and sugar levies) and national member state contribu-
tions, with the latter by far the largest share.
support by declaring that a tougher austerity program will 
produce growth benefits (IMF WEO 2010). At the same time, 
liquidity facilities provide financial stability AND an incentive 
for politically tough “real economy measures.”
All these steps for Greece derive from standard textbook 
directives of spending cuts, economic reforms, and hopes that 
in three years, the economy can improve and sustain its debt 
level. As I have suggested before, Greece is unlikely to enjoy 
such a turn of events.
As for the Irish package, on November 28 the European 
Union and the IMF provided an external support package 
of €67.5 billion, accompanied by an additional Irish pledge 
of €17.5 billion from domestic sources.8 The duration of the 
Irish assistance, however, was up to 10 years, longer than the 
three years for Greece. Irish aid comes at a slightly higher 
interest  rate  of  about  5.8  percent  (Ireland  Department  of 
Finance 2010). The euro group simultaneously offered Greece 
a substantial maturity extension in its May loan package from 
three years up to lengths matching Ireland’s terms, which also 
implied slightly higher interest rates for Greece.
While the precise details of the terms are not yet avail-
able, it seems inevitable that the maturity extension will force 
a reduction of the net present value (NPV) of the original 
eurozone loans to Greece. (The IMF on December 2 expressed 
its willingness to also extend the maturities of its loans to 
Greece [Atkinson 2010].)
Put another way, Greece has won an explicit amount of 
“debt relief.” Indeed, in the words of EU Commissioner Olli 
Rehn, this was carried out “to ensure the debt sustainability 
of Greece.” Implicitly, these decisions entailed a direct “fiscal 
transfer”  from  the  euro  group  (minus  Slovakia)  under  the 
stealthy heading of “aligning maturity extension to Irish terms.”
The willingness of the euro group to take this step (while 
not shouting about it) is a very important development with 
significant implications for the future. It means that small 
conditional fiscal transfers between member states are possible 
“to ensure debt sustainability,” albeit still under another name.
On November 28, EU leaders provided further details on 
a permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to replace 
the EFSF (Eurogroup 2010) after mid-2013. The ESM will 
be subject to unanimity in decisions, have preferred creditor 
status (junior only to IMF loans), and rules providing for a 
case-by-case participation of private sector creditors through 
Collective Action Clauses (CACs) after 2013.
8. This pledge of additional Irish domestic support makes the deal somewhat 
uncertain, given the upcoming Irish election (Kirkegaard 2010a). These con-
cerns should be clarified once the IMF, ECB, and EC inspection teams have 
examined the true health of the Irish banks.N u m b e r   Pb10 - 2 7   D e c e m b e r   2 0 1 0
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All  these  elements  offer  an  outline  for  the  permanent 
mechanisms  to  ensure  fiscal  and  financial  stability  in  the 
eurozone.  Combined  with  other  institutional  measures  to 
strengthen  economic  coordination  in  the  European  Union 
announced earlier,9 (European Council 2010) these mecha-
nisms will be mostly “market based.”
In its current form, the EFSF—at €440 billion, with only 
about €250 billion in actual lending potential—is not sufficient 
to offer any meaningful assistance to a large member state. But 
it is also clear that the EFSF can be expanded if circumstances 
dictate. The problem is that such an expansion might be inter-
preted as preparation for a crisis involving a large state, leading 
to a self-fulfilling prophecy. As a result, the EFSF or its replace-
ment ESM can probably only be expanded at a time of financial 
market calm or another acute crisis. It would thus be wise for 
EU leaders not to set a number for its size.
The record of anticipating crises is not good, however. EU 
leaders failed to deal with the short-term solvency concerns 
of Greece, Ireland,10 and Portugal. By providing Ireland with 
longer-maturity loans and offering Greece a degree of “debt 
relief,” they deferred the issue of tough actions into the future.
The problem of the unsustainable “old debt stock” and 
“new  debt  flow”  will  not  go  away  by  stating  that  all  debt 
issued before 2013 will not be subject to haircuts. Greece and 
perhaps also Ireland and Portugal will face enormous difficul-
ties in issuing new debt after 2013 if they still carry the burden 
of an unsustainable mountain of “old pre-2013 debt.” Because 
such new debt will be easier to restructure, it will be prohibi-
tively expensive to market. An ESM cannot hope to succeed 
until all eurozone countries are on a fiscally sustainable path.
An ultimately sustainable debt level for a country is a 
moving target. It seems evident, however, that the debt burden 
9. Among other things, these measures make it harder to cook the data “Greek 
style” and provide the European Commission with earlier powers to warn 
against lax fiscal policies.
10. In the case of Ireland the “solvency issue” is as much a potential “won’t 
pay” as “can’t pay.”
of Greece by 2013 or later of around 150 percent of GDP will 
not be sustainable. Consequently, Greece will at some point 
need to conduct a carefully negotiated debt restructuring. A 
similar process may also be necessary for Ireland (depending 
on the scale of bank losses) and perhaps Portugal.
The  ultimate  scale  of  losses  from  such  a  restructuring 
cannot  be  discerned  at  this  point.  For  Greece,  such  losses 
will depend on the success of the current IMF program. It 
is clear, on the other hand, that the realized losses in a cred-
ible restructuring designed to achieve a sustainable long-term 
fiscal path will run into the several hundreds of billions of 
euros. Greece’s current outstanding sovereign debt amounts 
to more than €300 billion, to which can be added Irish and 
Portuguese sovereign debts of €125 billion and €140 billion,11 
not to mention additional private debts that could end up as 
obligations of their governments.
Who will end up with this bill? Clearly the IMF will 
not take any losses. The liabilities will instead be distributed 
among the private sector and the eurozone countries. This will 
undoubtedly be a very messy process. If private debt holders 
do not end up paying everything, eurozone governments will 
have to fill the gap.
Any willingness of the eurozone governments to accept 
losses on Greek debts was signaled by the maturity extension 
of the loans to Greece announced on November 28. In addi-
tion, as eurozone governments, particularly Germany, set their 
sights on implementing the ESM within a relatively short time 
frame, they will likely be open to an expeditiously negotiated 
Greek solution facilitating such an outcome. Accepting some 
of the losses in a Greek restructuring may be a price Germany 
is willing to pay for setting up the ESM promptly.
One could imagine a haircut on claims as nonpreferred 
“eurozone claims on Greece” from the May package are trans-
ferred into preferred creditor claims of the permanent ESM. 
Such a step would be carried out in the name of ensuring 
Greece’s debt sustainability. Incorporating the “ad hoc Greek 
program” into the permanent ESM would then entail a fiscal 
transfer between eurozone member states—only by another 
name. Something similar could be imagined for transferring 
the temporary EFSF/ESM-funded package for Ireland into 
the ESM.
Would Germany be willing to entertain such a deal? This 
would depend on just how badly Berlin wants an operational 
ESM by 2013. But at least the timing is decent right now with 
Germany enjoying its fastest economic growth in 2010 since 
reunification (Vits 2010). By accepting some losses through this 
“implicit fiscal transfer,” Germany would still get to impose some 
11. Data from Q2 2010 (Eurostat 2010).
“By playing for time and offering liquidity 
support for troubled countries now, 
Europeans are counting on a return of 
growth leading to higher general bank 
capital levels, improved government fiscal 
positions and less need of such haircuts.”N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 2 7   De c e m b e r   2 0 1 0
5
negotiated pain on the banks through “private sector participa-
tion.” It would also get its way on setting up an ESM provision 
requiring unanimity for any future disbursement, which would 
grant effective veto power to Germany. Influencing the way the 
ESM is structured and the timing of its implementation is the 
strategic goal for which Berlin should be willing to contemplate 
accepting some losses on existing peripheral debt.
While the details and final size of the ESM design are 
still sketchy, it will be modeled on the existing EFSF model. 
This means that the ESM will have the structure of a de facto 
permanent “common Eurobond”—i.e., a bond guaranteed by 
all the eurozone members.
In its pure form, such a bond is surely not acceptable to 
any German government. It would simply be seen in Berlin and 
Frankfurt as driving up the cost of German borrowing, implic-
itly transferring the gains to the periphery by lowering their 
cost of debt. This would be a big step toward a standard “fiscal 
union,” the very thing that eurozone politics have ruled out.
But an “ad hoc ESM-Eurobond” would be a “conditional 
Eurobond.” Given the intended requirement for unanimity 
among eurozone governments for its use, peripheral countries 
could only gain access with the explicit blessing and condi-
tioning of Berlin and other eurozone members. Such a bond 
would not entail automatic fiscal transfers between eurozone 
members, but only “conditional fiscal transfers” payable if the 
recipient country “does its homework first.”12
Such an “ESM-Eurobond” would also offer EU leaders a 
future policy tool with which to counteract the worst asym-
metric  shocks  inside  the  eurozone.  It  would  be  extremely 
beneficial for the long-term stability of the monetary union. 
To  avoid  inevitable  market  speculation  about  whether  the 
ESM would be big enough for Spain, Italy, or another big 
country, it would probably be better not to specify the size of 
the ESM. Instead, like the ECB SMP, the ESM would be a 
flexible instrument that policymakers could calibrate.
Moreover, by being conditional rather than automatic, the 
implicit fiscal transfers made possible by an ESM-Eurobond 
would be subject to less moral hazard. Eurozone governments 
would know, first, that it would only be accessible after the 
dreaded visit of the IMF, ECB, and EC inspection team. (Ask 
Prime Minister Brian Cowen of Ireland about the effects of 
such a visit on your political future.) Similarly the ESM—
12. A conditional ESM-Eurobond would further have the advantage of 
probably being easier to legally justify under the EU Treaty Article 122.2, 
which enables “financial support for member states in difficulties caused by 
exceptional circumstances beyond member states’ control.” A conditional 
ESM-Eurobond would be legally classifiable as implemented under “excep-
tional circumstances.”
through its CACs and explicit option for private sector hair-
cuts—would lower moral hazard in the form of higher interest 
rates for governments running irresponsible policies.
The conditional “tough love transfer” of an ESM-Eurobond 
is likely to be the only politically feasible opportunity to truly 
deepen  European  fiscal  coordination.  Automatic  transfers  as 
carried out by the US federal government budget are simply not 
politically possible among the still largely sovereign members 
of the eurozone. Ironically, however, this explicit conditionality 
means that the European Union actually may end up having a 
permanent instrument to “discipline” the domestic policies of 
its members.
Given the history of states opposing interference from 
Washington,  the  US  federal  government  frequently  resorts 
to imposing conditions or offering incentives along with its 
funding grants. Even so, the US government’s powers over the 
states do not come close to the coercive force of IMF programs 
in Greece or Ireland. Once a “conditional ESM-Eurobond” is 
in place, eurozone members would have few ways to resist the 
power of the larger entity. Automatic transfers to local govern-
ments rob the center of tools to impose its will.
As illustrated by the examples of Italy’s history of trying to 
spur growth in the impoverished southern Mezzogiorno region, 
or federal Germany’s experiences in the former East Germany, 
automaticity in economic transfers is not what the European 
periphery needs now. Fiscal federalism is not the answer for 
Europe. Rather, permanent “fiscal conditionality” is.
Transfers to peripheral European countries accompanied 
by conditions or incentives, on the other hand, might protect 
the European Union from extreme populism in member states.
An  ESM-Eurobond  could  thus  preempt  superficially 
inviting  but  flawed  policies.  It  could  prevent  such  adverse 
developments as a European version of California’s Proposition 
13 curbing a state’s ability to raise taxes. It could also force a 
member state to clean up misleading pension accounting in a 
way the US government has failed to do (Cooper and Walsh 
2010) in states like Illinois.
Some interesting bond market dynamics between indi-
vidual member states and a sizeable ESM can be foreseen. The 
mechanism would, like the AAA-rated EFSF, issue new debt to 
provide a conditional transfer to a member state. A sizable ESM 
AAA-rated issuance—which would be required to provide aid 
to any large member state in the eurozone—would probably 
be  priced  above  the  current  eurozone  benchmark  German 
government bond, but definitely below a peripheral sovereign 
eurozone bond. This would hurt demand for both traditional 
sovereign issuers, where investors would be tempted to snap 
up the extra yield on offer relative to the German govern-N u m b e r   Pb10 - 2 7   D e c e m b e r   2 0 1 0
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ment bond, while other investors could get some exposure to 
the eurozone periphery through an ESM-Eurobond without 
taking on too much peripheral sovereign default risk.
The costs to Germany in the form of higher interest rates 
would  arguably  be  alleviated  by  a  much  stronger  German 
political hand in influencing the details of the “ESM condi-
tionality”  to  other  member  states  receiving  financial  aid. 
With German structural budget balance and presumed lower 
borrowing needs kicking in by 2016, this might be a bargain 
for Berlin.
Meanwhile, weaker peripheral countries face a problem 
not dissimilar to that of US municipal bond issuers versus 
the US Treasury bills: how to sell their debt when the market 
is flooded with such bonds without having to pay too high 
interest rates? Obviously, offering tax exempt status for euro-
zone peripheral sovereign bonds to sweeten the deal, as cities 
and states in the United States do, would not make any sense 
for any individual peripheral member. It would raise the total 
cost of their debt. Access to aid from an ESM-Eurobond would 
consequently come with both conditionality and, other things 
being equal, a higher cost of debt for peripheral countries.
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